Week 12: Terrorism

# Week 12: Terrorism
## The rational terrorist
### Danilo Freire
### 26 November 2019

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# Two week ago, we saw that

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* There has been many waves of terrorist activities, from the French Revolution to Radical Islamism today

* Jacobins, Narodnaya Volnya, Irish nationalists, Young Bosnia, anti-colonial movements, left-wing terrorist groups, Al Qaeda, etc

* Terrorism has been used both by governments and by non-state actors alike

* Definition: _use of violence, or threats of violence, to intimidate others, directly or indirectly, to achieve political goals_
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# Two week ago, we saw that

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* We also discussed some situations in which terrorism might be morally acceptable
  - Groups facing oppression, extreme violations of human rights

* Moral issues: 
  - Disrespect for war conventions, targeting innocent civilians, intent is difficult to justify

* Different definitions of terrorism have significant impact over our analyses

* It is a rational strategy, but it doesn't always work  
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# Early Warning Project updates

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# Early Warning Project updates

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# The rational terrorist
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# Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter

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# The strategies of terrorism

* Between 1980 and 2003, half of all suicide terrorism campaigns resulted in concessions by the government

* "Hijacking planes, blowing up buses, and kidnapping individuals [...] can be surprisingly effective"

* For counter-terrorism strategies to work it is important to understand what those groups want and whether/how they achieve their goals
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# The strategies of terrorism

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* The authors seek to answer four questions:
  - What types of goals do terrorists seek to achieve?
  - What strategies do they pursue to achieve these goals?
  - Why do these strategies work in some cases but not in others?  
  - What are the targeted governments’ best responses to prevent terrorism and protect their countries from future attacks?

* Main explanatory variable: _costly signalling_
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# The goals of terrorism

* This is particularly true for _suicide terrorists_

* Individuals have different motivations from their groups
  - Suicide bombers may seek financial benefits for their family or a pleasant afterlife
  - But the leaders have rational political goals
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# The goals of terrorism

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* The authors argues that terrorist groups have five goals:
  - Regime change (Sendero Luminoso, Hezbollah, Taliban)
  - Territorial change (Tamil Tigers, Lashkar-e Tayyiba in Kashmir)
  - Policy change (Al-Qaeda, Hamas)
  - Social control (KKK, Fascist regimes)
  - Status quo maintenance (LatAm paramilitaries, IRA)

* Regime change is the most common, followed by territorial change

* Many organisations have multiples goals at the same time
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# The strategies of terrorist violence

* The authors argue that _uncertainty_ and _costly signalling_ provide a good explanation]
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* **Uncertainty**: groups don't know what their enemies can do or how committed they are to a given policy 
 
* This setting of incomplete information leads to miscalculations and under- or over-estimation of the enemy's capabilities  
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# The strategies of terrorist violence

* However, simple verbal statements are not credible: people lie and bluff

* *How to convey reliable information?*
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* **Make that information costly to send**]

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# Brief digression on costly signalling
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# Why do peacocks have such long tails?

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# Bird of paradise

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# Gazelles stotting

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# Luxury goods

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# Luxury goods

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# Facial tattoos

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# ... back to terrorism

* Violence, mainly _suicidal violence_, is an extreme form of costly signalling

* How do terrorists use violence? According to five strategies, the authors argue
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# Five strategies

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# Attrition

* The greater the costs terrorists inflict today, the stronger the signal that they will inflict _even greater_ costs in the future

* Anti-colonial terrorism, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda

* Democracies are particularly _unlikely_ to retaliate and faces higher audience costs, thus they are the favourite target of attrition strategies
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# Responses to attrition

* Retaliation is a better strategy if the terrorists threaten core competences of the state

* Harden likely targets (additional security checkpoints, etc)

* Deny access to most destructive weapons (biological, nuclear, etc)

* Minimise psychological damage (keep calm and carry on)
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# Intimidation

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* Similar to deterrence: preventing undesired social behaviour with threats of, and actual, violence

* Targeted at the population terrorists are trying to control

* Left-wing groups, KKK, state terrorism

* Weak states facilitate intimidation strategies
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# Responses to intimidation

* "Clear, hold, and build": invest in state capacity

* Social control: better law enforcement

* Bypass local leaders 
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# Provocation

* Designed to persuade the domestic audience that the target of attacks is evil

* The goal is to shift citizen support away from the incumbent regime

* ETA: Spanish government reacted very strongly, so the population was shocked by the violence

* Democracies, again, are likely targets of provocation
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# Reactions to provocation

* Gathering information about the group

* Targeted killings
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# Spoiling

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* Terrorists use violence to force the government to negotiate or increase their bargaining power

* Often used when two enemies are close to reaching an agreement
  - Israel and PLO, Hamas spoiled the Camp David Agreements

* More likely to happen when moderates of a given groups are unlikely to hold extremists, or merely when the other party thinks that this is the case
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# Responses to spoiling

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* If mutual trust is high, negotiations should continue regardless of the terrorist attacks

* Since trust is often scarce, trust-building initiatives might work

* Power-sharing agreements, post-treaty reconciliation commissions, etc

* Effective protection of minority rights
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# Outbidding

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* "[...] when two or more domestic parties are competing for leadership of their side, and the general population is uncertain about which of the groups best represents their interests"
  - Hamas versus Fatah

* Moderates can actually _prefer_ the radicals to gain more prominence close to negotiations with the enemy: lower margin for bargain

* Citizens might believe their representatives will "sell out", so they might prefer the zealots to step in

* As expected, outbidding is more likely to happen when many groups are competing for power
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# Responses to outbidding

* If not possible, grant them concessions

* Favour one of the groups?
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# Conclusion

* Terrorists use violence to signal that they are committed to their causes

* (States can do the same too!)

* Five strategies: 
  - Attrition, Intimidation, Provocation, Spoiling, and Outbidding
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# Questions?
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# Robert Pape

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# Introduction

* Before the 1980s, suicide attacks were rare

* First wave explanations: 
  - Religious fanaticism, psychological dispositions

* The world's leaders in suicide attacks are the Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)

* Large variation in terrorist characteristics (gender, education, age, etc)

* Pape argues that terrorism follows a _strategic logic_
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# How can suicide be rational?

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* Even if the person who commits a suicide attack is not rational, _the leaders probably are_

* Thomas Schelling: "rationality of irrationality" (The Strategy of Conflict)
  
* Niccolò Machiavelli: "it is a very wise thing to simulate madness" (Discourses on Livy, 3:2)

* Suicide terrorism is analogous to international coercion (madman theory) 
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# Defining suicide terrorism

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* Suicide terrorism is an attack in which the death of the perpetrator is required for the attack to succeed

* Usually, the goal is to the highest number of people as possible

* This forces the government to consider the demands of the terrorist group

* It is a coercive strategy: 
  - While the military coerces people because it is strong, terrorists coerce people because they are weak

* However, this coercion might alienate potential supporters, too
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# Defining suicide terrorism

* They are generally much more destructive (suicide vests, hijacking planes);

* Very strong costly signal: if terrorists are willing to die for the cause, what _can't_ they do?

* Better able to communicate commitment and increasing levels of violence in the future 
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# The record of terrorism

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# The record of terrorism  
 
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* _Timing_: From 188 attacks, 179 (95%) were part of a campaign

* End of the campaigns determined by the leaders when they believe some of their demands have been achieved

* _Nationalist goals_: since costs of suicide attacks are high, groups resort to them only when stakes are very high, too

* Every campaign from 1980 to 2001 has been directed to take "foreign invaders out of the homeland" 
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# The record of terrorism

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# The record of terrorism

* **Why?**
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* Democracies are less likely to use force domestically

* Democracies make more concessions to opposition groups

* Democracies have free press and uncensored social media, which publicise the attacks 
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# Terrorists' assessment of suicide terrorism

* In the case of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Tamil Tigers, they were able to force the state to negotiate in about 50% of the cases

* But this also implies that the attacks often failed, too

* The most successful group which uses suicide terrorism is Hamas
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# The limits of suicide terrorism

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* In the 1980s, terrorist leaders thought that moderate punished led to moderate concessions; but do harsh punishments lead to greater concessions?

* _Apparently not_

* Suicide terrorism campaigns are only modestly more successful than their alternatives

* Suicide terrorism is unlikely to make states change policies that are crucial to their survival 
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# Policy recommendations

* Pape proposes demographic separation to deal with terrorism. What do you think?
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# Conclusion

* They are more destructive and show stronger resolve

* Democracies are often targeted by terrorist groups

* Suicide terrorism often works, but can't change important issues in the enemy state

* Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, and Al Qaeda are the most significant examples of suicide terrorists
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# John Horgan

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# Introduction

* Very few people engage in terrorism, so all generalisations are made from a small sample

* Another issue is that of profiling: treating terrorists as pathological cases

* For instance, 2 million Muslims live in the UK, many sharing similar social, political, economic, and religious conditions
  - Why do only very few radicalise?
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# Openness to socialisation into terrorism

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* While avoiding profiling, the author lists some factors that increase the risk of radicalisation

* Feelings of anger, alienation, and disenfranchisement

* The perception that conventional political activity does not work

* Identification with victims, either real or in more abstract terms

* Beliefs that violence against the state or against fellow citizens is not immoral
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# Openness to socialisation into terrorism

* Kinship and social ties, sense of belonging

* **Question**: which one do you think is the most important? Is there any factor that he missed?
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# Terrorist pathways

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* Terrorist organisations have a myriad of positions, so many members don't have the same role for a long time
  - People involved in violent attacks participate in political negotiations, etc

* Qualitative interviews highlight some similarities in the pathways:
  - Role models (the Prophet, Wahabi leaders, Che, Fidel)
  - Families involved in the community 
  - Sense of respect for terrorists
  - Material incentives
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# Implications for counter-terrorism

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* Since it hard to fix the "push factors" (general conditions), states should focus on the "pull factors"

* Expose activities of the leaders that other members find immoral

* Invest in counter-propaganda showing the impact of terrorism on the victims

* Use the most credible sources at their disposal 
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# Conclusion

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* Since there number of terrorists is very small, current conclusions are conditional on particular characteristics of each case

* Some factors do appear to be correlated with engagement in terrorist activities:
  - emotional vulnerability, dissatisfaction with politics, identification with the victims, belief that violence is morally justified, sense of belonging, social ties

* Terrorists occupy different positions in their careers

* Counter-propaganda can be used to dissuade terrorists
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# Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog

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# Introduction

* While there is indeed a correlation between years of education and militancy in left-wing and Islamist groups, it is unclear why engineers comprise such a big share of radical Muslims

* Although the authors also agree that terrorist profiles vary substantially, some particular cognitive and personality traits might be similar

* Education choices might be a proxy for some of them 
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#  Islamic extremists in Muslin countries

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#  Islamic extremists in Muslim countries  
 
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* Sample of 404 terrorists

* They found educational information for 284 individuals 
  
* 196 (69%) had higher education, whereas university enrolment rates in the Arab world was around 12%

* 44% of them were engineers, in contrast with 2-3% in the general population

* Saudi Arabia is an exception
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# Islamic extremists in Muslim countries

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# Islamic extremists in Western countries

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* 265 terrorists, the authors found educational information for 54 cases. 21 had university degrees]
  
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# Non-violent Islamists

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# Non-Islamic extremists

* Not the case: the RAF, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, and Latin American urban guerrilla groups included almost no engineers

* Among right-wing extremists, who generally had much lower levels of education, engineers if not over-represented are at least clearly present

* Right-wing engineers do not stand out as strikingly as Islamic radical engineers
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# Hypotheses

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* Network diffusion 
  - Social ties are crucial for the success of illegal networks
  - If the first movers were engineers, they tend to continue recruiting engineers to join the groups
  - They find out this is not the case

* Technical skills
  - No evidence this was the major recruitment criterion 
  - No need for high technical expertise

* Both are unconvincing
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# The engineering "mindset"

* US data: about 58% of engineers declare that they are conservative, more than any other group

* Science (1972): "No other variable differentiates politically among American academics as effectively as their professional field"

* Engineers are also the most religious group of academics: 66%

* They are also more likely to be both conservative and religious in other Western countries
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# Mechanisms

* Dislike for ambiguity and an appreciation for "the most efficient way" to solve problems

* This is probably due to self-selection, not education

* Also, engineering has high prestige in Muslim countries, so individuals might be more ambitious than average, too

* Technocratic idea of development, but lack of opportunities
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# Mechanisms and conclusion

* An explosive mix:
  - A conservative and religious group;
  - Who sees the world as an ordered cosmos, where everyone has their own place; 
  - With largely frustrated professional and personal development expectations;
  - Without the possibility to express their concerns in authoritarian regimes
  - _Radicalisation_

* **Question**: does that seem convincing to you?
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# See you next week!
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